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Abstract 
This thesis presents an analysis of the impact that African actors had on the Commonwealth, 
after their independence. By tracing their agency during the Rhodesian crisis within the forum 
of the Commonwealth during 1964 to 1969, this thesis endeavours to expose a distinct 
perspective of its history and transformation. It reveals how those actors shaped the 
Commonwealth, in their demand for majority rule and the end to the racist regime in 
Rhodesia. Incorporating these actors into research on the Commonwealth during the crisis 
reveals how they guided discussions on racial equality during the Conferences in the 1960s. 
These actors not only managed to alter the character, debate and principles of the 
Commonwealth, additionally they shaped the wider agenda of international relations, to 
prioritise issues of race in other forums such as the United Nations.  
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Introduction 
 
The Commonwealth of Nations, created at first in 1931, comprises of fifty-three independent 
states from the Global ‘North’ and ‘South’ and spans across five regions.1 At first designed to 
entrench British imperial interests after its descent from Empire, it became known as a 
“family of nations”, connected by their colonial history. From 1947, it began to integrate its 
colonial subjects into an international organisation and merged a myriad of diverse identities 
and experiences.2 After the independence of India and Pakistan in the late 1940s, the 
Commonwealth entered into a new era, one in which the ‘modern’ Commonwealth transpired 
in a unique, unpredictable and fascinating way. With the independence of twelve African 
nations from 1957, it was then hailed as the “multi-racial” Commonwealth. Without a doubt, 
                                            
1 “About us,” The Commonwealth, accessed January 10, 2019, https://thecommonwealth.org/. 
2 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Communiqué, 1960.  
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the political upheaval of the African continent in the 1960s was the “greatest single change” 
that the Commonwealth had witnessed.3 
 
Despite this upheaval, there remains no explicit literature that concentrates on the role of 
African actors in the Commonwealth. While scholars such as Mazrui and Marshall highlight 
their involvement in the organisation’s transformation, many do not focus on the ‘African’ 
Commonwealth in its entirety and additionally often write from a British centred perspective.4 
Nor does much literature bring the global history of the Commonwealth into focus. Hence 
there appears to be an opportunity to correct the one-sided approach to the analysis of the 
Commonwealth, thus my thesis endeavours to focus on this understudied African dimension. 
This thesis poses the research question: How did African actors change the Commonwealth 
after independence? In assessing this change, this thesis traces the actions of African 
Commonwealth members during the Rhodesian crisis from 1964 until 1969, to reveal the 
impact they had on the Commonwealth.  
 
Once part of the British Empire and like most other colonies, Rhodesia (also known as 
Southern Rhodesia and later Zimbabwe) attempted to become independent of Britain from the 
late 1950s. Yet the path to independence was a much longer and arduous struggle when 
compared to others in the region. Never explicitly governed by Britain, a racist and arbitrary 
white population held legitimate power, ruling the native African population since its 
inception in 1899. After the wave of decolonisation had begun to sweep over the African 
continent, Rhodesia’s neighbours became independent under African majorities. Concerned 
                                            
3 David McIntyre, The Commonwealth Of Nations (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1977): 
446.  
4 Ali A. Mazrui, The Ango-African Commonwealth: Political Friction and Cultural Fusion (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press Ltd, 1967); Philip Murphy, The Empire’s New Clothes. The Myth of the 
Commonwealth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).  
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with the effect this might have on its white population and desire to continue ruling itself, the 
Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith declared a ‘Universal Declaration of Independence’ 
(UDI) from Britain in November 1965. Failing to prevent this, the British Government 
announced this illegal however this illegal regime would continue to hold power until 1980.  
 
The Rhodesian crisis is often discussed by assessing the role of Britain, the United States 
(US) or the United Nations (UN). However, the following research focuses on how the crisis 
was handled, debated and acted upon within the Commonwealth and illuminates the agency 
of its African Commonwealth members in attempting to bring Rhodesia to majority rule. 
Additionally, it will outline how the issue of racial equality dominated the minds of African 
elites; this motivated them to shape not only the Commonwealth, but also the wider 
international relations agenda. The purpose of this research is to re-evaluate and de-Briticise 
the Commonwealth’s history, highlighting the impact that newly independent African 
countries had on the very essence of the organisation.  
 
This thesis begins with a comprehensive literature review of the Commonwealth’s history and 
the Rhodesian crisis to date. While both are not completely overlooked topics, I argue that 
little has been done to facilitate a focus on the international dimensions. Following this, I will 
outline the context of the Rhodesian crisis and its problematic history up until the UDI in 
1965. Furthermore, the thesis will proceed in analysing the impact of its African members, 
structured chronologically by Commonwealth meetings. These were once called the 
‘Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conferences’, later changing to ‘Commonwealth Head’s of 
Government Meetings’, to cover the diverse political circumstances of its members. These 
were once largely unstructured meetings, held every couple of years, however during this 
period they were held more often than any before and after. These conferences will illuminate 
the actions taken by the African Commonwealth members to demand racial equality, not only 
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for African Rhodesian, fellow Commonwealth countries but also for the entire world. This 
analysis sheds light on how the Commonwealth was undeniably challenged, resisted and 
transformed throughout this period, in many ways unthinkable when it was first created in the 
early twentieth century.  
 
Methodology  
 
Using a range of archival sources, this thesis explores the understudied impact of African 
actors on the Commonwealth. First and foremost my analysis will focus primarily on the 
official “Final Communiqués” of the Commonwealth Conferences, from 1964 until 1969. I 
discovered these in the National Archives, as well as the useful book documented by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat titled The Commonwealth at the Summit: Communiqués of 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, 1944-1986. Due to the huge quantity of 
documents, I have chosen to remain focused on the 1960s, since most British colonies had just 
become independent and because this period reveals the most conspicuous change. Prior to 
the 1960s, meetings were given much less significance; on average each Communiqué lasted 
one to three pages from 1944 until 1960, and this reflects the absence of vigorous debate. 
However, during the 1960s, the Communiqués were rarely below five pages and often 
reached more than ten. Indeed this period was the most contested, as well as the most active 
period for the Commonwealth; with its ‘new’ members having a greater interest in using this 
platform to debate international issues than its ‘old’ ones.  
 
Relying solely on the official documents of the Commonwealth overlooks the fact that the 
organisation is largely structured through informal networks and consultations. Since the final 
Communiqués do not reflect the full level of debate, nor do they capture different reactions 
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and emotions expressed by its members, I will also include unofficial telegrams and letters, 
also found at the National Archives. After the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat 
in 1965, members used it to contact each other and interestingly it shows how Britain’s 
involvement in all Commonwealth matters was often bypassed. Since the National Archives 
are in London, I have also used various British Foreign office sources to further uncover the 
actions taken by African Commonwealth members to compel Britain to act in Southern 
Rhodesia. In addition, I found it fascinating to understand how British prime ministers and 
diplomats dealt with and felt about the newer members. Undoubtedly, it is impossible to avoid 
bias on every source, and this is common in both the British and Commonwealth Secretariat 
sources. Yet combining the more impartial Commonwealth documents and personal opinions 
expressed in private discussions allows me to avoid a complete one-sided perspective on this 
period. Hence this thesis endeavours to offer a distinctive, and comprehensive account of the 
actions taken during the lengthy struggle for independence in Southern Rhodesia, by focusing 
on the African Commonwealth members’ intervention in a crisis that was intended to be the 
former coloniser’s sole responsibility.  
 
To trace the impact of African actors on the Commonwealth, I will use process tracing. This 
is described as an “analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic 
pieces of evidence— often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or 
phenomena”.5 This will enable me to trace the agency of those African members, exhibited 
during those meetings and beyond, and view how they managed to transform the 
Commonwealth during this period. This thesis attempts to correct the one sided dominance of 
Commonwealth studies, incorporating a wider range of actors, especially the neglected 
‘African’ part of the Commonwealth. It intends to realign Commonwealth history away from 
                                            
5 David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” Political Science & Politics 44, no. 4 (2011): 823-
824. 
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the West and incorporate the perspective of African actors in its history and on the wider 
agenda of International Relations.   
 
Literature review  
 
The Commonwealth 
 
The British Commonwealth of Nations was first announced at the Imperial Conference in 
1926, although there were previous discussions about a “family of nations” during the height 
of the British Empire.6 It stated that there are Communities within the British Empire, were 
“equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or 
external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”.7 Those dominion communities were 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and would later become known as the “old” 
commonwealth members.8 They finally joined together in what was the British 
Commonwealth of Nations in 1931. WWI began to disturb the “British world-system”, thus 
the Commonwealth was put forward as a means of to preserve Britain’s “privileged special 
relationship with its empire” and to promote their global and national status.9 The significance 
given to the organisation was clear, evident as Winston Churchill envisioned the organisation 
as a “third force” together with the Soviet Union and the USA.10 Dudley argues that the 
Commonwealth had a sort of coherence and stability, with a “monopolistic position”, when it 
                                            
6 Peter Marshall, “The Balfour Formula and the Evolution of the Commonwealth,” The Round Table 
90, vol. 361 (2001): 545; David McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-1990, 
(Christchurch: University of Canterbury Press, 1991), 13. 
7 Her Majesty’s Government. The Imperial Conference. 1926. 
https://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/transcripts/cth11_doc_1926.pdf.  
8 Ireland was a dominion at this moment, however they chose not to be a Commonwealth member.  
9 John Darwin, The Empire Project, The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970 (UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009): 418; Krishnan Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the 
British Commonwealth (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 10.  
10 McIntyre, The Significance of the Commonwealth, 66.  
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was “almost the only organisation bringing together a number of nations in pursuit of shared 
interest”.11 This was certainly the case, where the countries within the Commonwealth were 
countries with predominantly white populations, with the interest of maintaining links with 
those of a shared history and identity.  
 
India and Pakistan’s accession would begin the development towards a modern, multi-racial 
organisation, with allegiance to the British monarchy no longer being a requirement for 
membership. This period was labelled as the “second Commonwealth”, in which its white 
members were still the majority and arguably brought a “deepened distrust of imperialism and 
common dislike for racial discrimination” to discussions.12 Both countries were eager to 
continue links with Britain and wanted to benefit from increased connections with other 
Commonwealth members. The joining of Ghana and Nigeria marked the “third 
Commonwealth”, tilting the racial composition and “strengthening the principle of multi-
racialism”.13 It is largely debated among scholars, including Dudley and Homes, that the huge 
wave of independence in Africa ultimately changed the Commonwealth, in a way that made it 
“unrecognisable” even from the “second Commonwealth”.14 
 
Former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan stated, “the Empire is not breaking up, it is 
growing up” and these imperial notions about Britain and the superiority of its old dominions 
would continue well into its existence, creating dissonance within the organisation.15 
Undoubtedly the transition between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Commonwealth was taken with 
                                            
11 B. J. Dudley, “The Commonwealth and the Nigeria/Biafra conflict,” The impact of African issues 
on the Commonwealth (1969): 14-30. 
12 Ali A. Mazrui, The Ango-African Commonwealth: Political Friction and Cultural Fusion (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press Ltd, 1967), 2. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Dudley, “The Commonwealth and the Nigeria/Biafra conflict,” 29; John Homes, “The Impact of the 
Commonwealth on the Emergence of Africa,” International Organisation 16, no. 2 (1962): 291-293. 
15 Krishnan Srinivasan, “Nobody’s Commonwealth? The Commonwealth in Britain’s post-imperial 
adjustment,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 44, vol. 2 (2006): 261. 
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caution by British politicians. Darwin highlights how Churchill was apprehensive towards 
permitting newly independent members to join, largely because they felt their own relations 
with its older members would be impeded.16 Additionally, Darwin claims Britain would hold 
the core until the organisation became less about British membership, and more about using it 
as a platform to resist British sustained attempts at “old fashioned imperialism”.17 The 
Commonwealth first served as a “blunting tool for anti-colonial attitudes”, however it is clear 
that the rise in membership from the Third World would have several effects: British 
influence would diminish, Commonwealth solidarity would be tested and particularly the 
African bloc of nations would use the organisation to resist not only Britain’s authority but 
began to alter the Commonwealth’s principles.18 In effect, decolonisation – especially on the 
African continent – challenged its very preservation.  
 
Discussions on the Commonwealth have continued to be dominated by the view that the 
organisation was exclusively this construction of British imperialism. In many ways this 
transpired. The fact that the British monarchy has always been the head of the Commonwealth 
reiterates this view.19 Lawal’s account also aligns with this view, where he argues that Britain 
devised decolonisation for Nigeria in a deliberate and well-considered manner. Britain’s 
transfer of power to its colonial countries through the Commonwealth, was thought to be, on 
the one hand a way to contain colonial nationalism, and on the other, a guarantee that newly 
independent countries would continue to be dependent on Britain, thus maintaining the 
economic and political benefits of its former colony.20 Lawal highlights how Britain sought 
not to end the formal empire, but instead transform it into something that would continue to 
                                            
16 Darwin, The Empire Project, 571-562. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Mélanie Torrent, “A Commonwealth Approach to Decolonisation,” Études Anglaises 65, no. 3 
(2012): 349-350. 
20 Olakunle A. Lawal,  “From Colonial Reforms to Decolonization: Britain and the Transfer of Power 
in Nigeria, 1947-1960”, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 19 (2010): 42-55. 
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offer the benefits of being an imperial power. Similar to many accounts on the organisation, 
Lawal focuses on British perceptions about Nigeria’s independence, and it would have been 
fascinating to compare how particular Nigerian elites considered the Commonwealth at this 
time. This would have created a more thorough depiction of the organisation from a variety of 
perspectives. This position also fails to consider the reality of the situation. Decolonisation 
rapidly transpired, in a way that Britain did not plan, and this had many effects on the 
Commonwealth.  
 
Although I agree with the fact that the Commonwealth was at first designed to safeguard 
British imperialism and maintain its global power, I notice that many authors elevate this 
when examining Commonwealth history. It is noteworthy, however a fixation of this very fact 
has led scholars to somewhat neglect Commonwealth studies beyond its relevance to Britain. 
Moreover, failing to consider other perspectives has ensured a limited focus on the 
transformation of, the largely cohesive Commonwealth, to one that was internally contested 
(as result of the accession of newly independent countries). In addition, it largely overlooks 
the way that African members transformed the character, meaning and discussion within the 
Commonwealth. My research therefore endeavours to shed light on how newly independent 
African members not only reinvigorated the Commonwealth (beyond British means), as well 
as how they shaped the international agenda, particularly on matters of race. Nonetheless, 
there is some discussion on it, which I will highlight in the following section.  
 
Transformation of the Commonwealth  
 
There is recognition in the literature that from the 1960s onwards, the character of the 
organisation had begun to change. This was undoubtedly due to the unparalleled development 
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of decolonisation. The post-war period saw the increased prevalence of nationalist 
movements, whereby unified dialogues within the Commonwealth were “shattered by the 
arrival of the rest”.21 Homes explores this and argues how the emergence of an independent 
Africa altered the very meaning of the Commonwealth, where decolonisation guided it to 
become a ‘new’ multiracial Commonwealth.22 There was no doubt that British politicians 
showed scepticism to the African entry into the Commonwealth, and they largely feared that 
the creation of an Afro-Asian bloc would act as a hindrance to their interests. This transition 
also coincided with the creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat, which was widely 
supported by several African leaders as “a means of taking the Commonwealth conference 
machinery out of Britain’s hands”.23 The institutionalising element of the organisation, as well 
as the altering of its character would present defiance within the Commonwealth, against its 
former colonizer.24   
 
Torrent explores how the accession of non-white members severely curtailed the “British 
character that had remained central to the Commonwealth”.25 This is evident in the Rhodesian 
crisis, when matters usually carried out in a bilateral way with Britain, also had to deal with 
various positions from its African members, even when Britain and Southern Rhodesia 
constantly claimed it to be Britain’s sole responsibility. Torrent argues that the 
Commonwealth must be positioned within the global context, in order to see how the 
organisation was altered by decolonisation and became much more about resistance and 
opposition, as it was purely a subsection of British dominance.26 The strength and 
                                            
21 Timothy M. Shaw and Lucian M. Ashworth, “Commonwealth Perspectives on International 
Relations,” International Affairs 86, vol. 5 (2010): 1155. 
22 Homes, “The Impact of the Commonwealth on the Emergence of Africa,” 291-293.  
23 Lorna Lloyd, “‘Us and Them': The Changing Nature of Commonwealth Diplomacy, 1880-1973,” 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 39, no. 3 (2002): 24.  
24 Lawal, “From Colonial Reforms to Decolonization,” 50.  
25 Torrent, “A Commonwealth Approach to Decolonisation,” 355. 
26 Ibid, 358-360. 
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distinctiveness of Torrent’s argument is apparent when he highlights the agency of non-
British actors, like Nkrumah in Ghana, while many other accounts tend to focus on British 
officials and policies alone. Looking at how members outside of Britain elevated their ideas 
about decolonisation, and its subsequent effects offers us a different analysis about the 
Commonwealth; my research intends to duplicate this focus.    
 
In contrast, Srinivasan incongruously refers to the organisation as the “British 
Commonwealth”, and concentrates predominantly on how Britain became uninterested when 
it could not exert its influence, the way it had previously. He fails to accurately explore the 
value of the organisation to other members and ultimately takes away their agency within it. 
This approach rests in large because Srinivasan relies only on secondary sources and the 
Round Table, and is therefore dominated by British views. I was highly disappointed with 
Srinivasan’s piece because I expected that his chapters called the “Nehru Commonwealth” 
and the “African Commonwealth” would involve voices from newly independent countries. 
This would have been a welcome change from Commonwealth history, however Srinivasan 
does not offer this. May and Mole also argue it seems the Commonwealth is only given 
consideration by Srinivasan when explored through British eyes.27 By focusing on the impact 
of African members into the Commonwealth, my research endeavours to offer a concrete 
study on the “African Commonwealth” in its own right, which Srinivasan regrettably fails to 
do. 
 
Onslow offers a more nuanced account of the Commonwealth’s history, differing from 
Srinivasan since she takes into consideration the organisation’s shift away from British 
command. As well she places it within the context of the geopolitical environment. She 
                                            
27 David McIntyre, Stuart Mole, Lucian M. Ashworth, Timothy M. Shaw and Alex, May, “Whose 
Commonwealth? Responses to Krishnan Srinivasan's The Rise, Decline and Future of the British 
Commonwealth,” The Round Table 96, vol. 388 (2007): 58. 
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argues that in a variety of ways, the Commonwealth adopted a neutral approach and instead 
played a particular role in debates about state building, development and racial justice.28 As a 
result of this, she argues that newly independent countries and smaller states saw the 
organisation as a platform to enhance their voice internationally and this is especially 
prevalent in terms of promoting racial equality.29 The Commonwealth’s relaxed type of 
diplomacy offered formal and informal networks, and allowed newly independent countries, 
such as the prominent case of Nigeria, to promote its own principles and goals.30 Onslow does 
well to assess the organisation not just from a realist perspective of hard power, military 
alliances and economic capabilities, but also by looking at its soft power and symbolic 
importance. This contribution is notable because it begins to shed a new light on how other 
nations viewed and acted within the Commonwealth, telling a different narrative to the 
familiar one, that the Commonwealth was merely Britain clutching onto its fallen Empire.  
  
Mazrui argues that the Commonwealth had two influential cores, the British and the African, 
forging what he calls the “Anglo-African Commonwealth”.31 The beginning of this shift was 
South Africa’s decision to withdraw their membership in 1961, and demonstrated the “impact 
of the new black states on this community of nations”. Miller, who writes an excellent chapter 
about how the African dimension altered the Commonwealth, also expresses an interesting 
interpretation. Miller argues that African Commonwealth members not only “damaged the 
fragile sense of unity”, but significantly challenged the principles that the Commonwealth had 
once stood for, in which Africa brought debates about self-determination, multi-racialism, 
                                            
28 Sue Onslow, “The Commonwealth and the Cold War, Neutralism, and Non-Alignment,” The 
International History Review 37, no. 5 (2015): 1060. 
29 Ibid, 1071. 
30 Ibid 1068; Donnelly, Elizabeth and Daragh Neville. “Nigeria and the Commonwealth: Influence by 
Accident or Design.” in The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics edited by Carl Levan and Patrick 
Ukata (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 715. 
31 Ali A. Mazrui, The Ango-African Commonwealth, 33. 
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one-man-one-vote, into the centre of Commonwealth values.32 What is most notable about 
Miller’s discussion is the way he outlines how African independence not only changed the 
character of the Commonwealth, but also altered the cohesive characteristic of it. Many 
scholars, including Srinivasan and Mazrui highlight this change but fail to consider the exact 
effect of their accession. In line with Miller’s argument, I aim to explore in more detail the 
specific ways in which African members disrupted the Commonwealth. 
 
Indisputably, African members bolstered diplomacy on issues, injecting them with “tone, 
temper and emotion”.33 Diplomatic relations within the Commonwealth had moved away 
being a “cosy white man’s club”, to one where its very preservation was questioned.34 African 
nationalism undoubtedly became a nuisance for Britain during the 1960s and 1970s, where 
African members brought a “kind of antagonism and acrimony”, altering the very nature of 
the Commonwealth’s political debate.35 McKinnon highlights the key role that the African 
continent and its leaders played in its evolution. He is an ardent advocate, holding the position 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and writing at this time he held the position of Secretary 
General of the Commonwealth.36 It is fascinating how in multiple outlets he discusses the role 
of Africa in its history, not just by focusing on the fact that its membership made up a larger 
bloc, but how its leaders shaped political debate and altered its identity. His positive attitude 
on the organisation is guided by his personal experiences and his position, and in some ways 
embellishes it in a largely optimistic way, trying to show that there have been positive 
elements to the Commonwealth. He fails to consider the way members disagreed on many 
                                            
32 JBD Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969,  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974): 247-263. 
33 Ali A. Mazrui, The Ango-African Commonwealth, 1; Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: 
Problems of Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969, 259. 
34 Lloyd, “‘Us and Them', 24. 
35 Srinivasan, The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth, 48. 
36 Don McKinnon, “After Abuja: Africa and the Commonwealth,” The Round Table 93, no. 375 
(2004): 403-404.  
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occasions, which led to slow action or inaction, nonetheless his analysis on the impact of 
African leaders is significant since they are so often omitted.  
 
Limitations to Commonwealth literature 
 
One central issue with academic literature on the Commonwealth is that it has been labelled 
as an organisation with no real power, effectiveness or value to most of its members. The 
Commonwealth’s lack of institutional capabilities and relatively informal nature means that it 
does not possess the equivalent characteristics of the typical international organisation; 
therefore it has not been given similar attention to other international groupings like the UN or 
NATO. However, the global platform provided another outlet for newly independent nations 
in Africa and Asia to use, as a way of promoting key issues and have their say on international 
problems. Donnelly and Neville highlight how the Commonwealth was also a “forum through 
which common positions can be negotiated and given a trial, before taken to other multilateral 
fora, such as the United Nations”.37 Many International Relations scholars therefore overlook 
the importance it was given by its members, especially at the beginning of this “new” 
Commonwealth. My research gives focus to the Commonwealth’s position in the international 
system, recognising the importance it was given by its newer members. By doing this, I will 
highlight how it enabled members not only to shape the Commonwealth, but also the agenda 
of international relations.  
 
Furthermore, limited attention on a variety of Commonwealth perspectives has, in my 
opinion, created two prevalent assumptions. The first is that it is largely remains as the 
‘British Commonwealth’, dominated principally by their interests. While it was first 
                                            
37 Donnelly and Neville, “Nigeria and the Commonwealth”, 715.  
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constructed as that, relations within the Commonwealth did not only mean relations with 
Britain; the fact that both Ghana and Tanzania cut diplomatic relations with the British 
Government but remained a Commonwealth member emphasises this point. As well, this 
preoccupation ensures that most literature on the Commonwealth fails to truly consider its 
importance to a variety of its members and the way it was drastically transformed with 
decolonisation, in turn offering a simplistic account of its history. This was certainly not 
accurate and my research endeavours to illuminate how the Commonwealth after African 
independence was significant altered, and that for many newly independent African countries, 
it was a valued site for the promotion of key values, especially racial equality.  
 
The second assumption is that it had very little to say about international affairs, and was 
largely “outside the parameter of world politics”.38 Especially during the 1960s, the 
Commonwealth became an organisation that played a bigger role than the UN and the OAU in 
internal disputes of its members and on particular international affairs, including the case 
study I explore. Miller accurately highlights that these crises showed that issues labelled as 
purely inter-organisational questions “could be tossed backwards and forwards between the 
UN and the Commonwealth, with the OAU as intervener”.39 The Commonwealth was 
entangled in complex international issues, especially during the process of decolonisation and 
around the issue of racial equality. An inadequate discussion on various Commonwealth 
perspectives fails to consider it’s bearing in international relations, but also overlooks 
important actions taken by non-British actors, which not only transformed the Commonwealth 
itself but also the way the international system was ordered.   
 
                                            
38 Rasheeduddin Khan, “Commonwealth and the Third World,” India Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1984): 57. 
39 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, 259. 
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These conclusions are inconsistent with what my research examines. My analysis will 
therefore attempt to illuminate a different story about the Commonwealth. Focusing on the 
mid-1960s, I will examine one important moment in which the Commonwealth was 
undoubtedly reinvigorated: the Rhodesian crisis. First however, I will explore academic 
literature on the Rhodesian crisis. 
 
Literature on the Rhodesian crisis  
 
The Rhodesian crisis was a hugely divisive matter among Commonwealth members, whereby 
“Wilson found it extremely difficult to balance the conflicting demands of African 
Commonwealth leaders and the Rhodesian Government”.40 Although Rhodesian Prime 
Minister Ian Smith reiterated that the issue was a matter only for Britain and Rhodesia, the 
issue became a chronic rupture in the organisation, and for over twenty years Commonwealth 
meetings devoted most of their time on it. As Jamaluddin accurately points out, the CPMM 
served a critical purpose in allowing various actors express their views on the matter, 
heightening tensions and the ability to vocally criticise the illegal regime.41 Donnelly et al 
assesses how the Lagos conference was a way that Nigeria attempted to direct debate on the 
issue. Due to its economic reliance on Britain, Nigeria urged members to severe ties with 
Rhodesia but not to break with Britain, instead encouraging other African members to keep 
debate open with its former coloniser.42 The CPMM was a platform in which debate was 
fragmented and contested on the Rhodesian crisis, but as well it offered a chance for African 
voices to be elevated African against white-minority governments.  
 
                                            
40 Ibid, 326.  
41 Jazliza Jamaluddin, “The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM): the United 
Kingdom and the Rhodesian problem, 1966-79,” The University of Nottingham (2016): 13.  
42 Donnelly and Neville, “Nigeria and the Commonwealth”, 716-717. 
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Mazrui points out the distinctiveness of the situation. No British Prime Minister had ever met 
with a rebel from its own colony before, and he asks why this might have been. Firstly the 
issue of race was prominent. Smith was a European Rhodesia, and therefore it was clear that 
Britain would not use force against its “kith and kin”, like it had previously against black 
rebels in Kenya. The way that Britain was willing to use force on Kenya, but not on Rhodesia, 
“heightened racial tensions”.43 Secondly, the unique way Rhodesia had largely governed itself 
for years was another reason, but Mazrui also highlights the fact that prior to Smith’s UDI, 
Wilson had reassured him that force would not be used against them. This certainly made the 
situation much more difficult because Wilson clearly had no form of threat to make against 
Smith during his negotiations. This account underlines how this crisis was hugely difficult 
and problematic for the Commonwealth.  
 
As one of the few academics that study the Rhodesian crisis specifically in reference to the 
Commonwealth, Watts’ explores the relations between its old members and Britain. Tracing 
how differences in attitudes impacted the handling of the crisis, Watts argues that Canada was 
the most active member when compared to New Zealand and Australia. It found sympathies 
for white Europeans in Rhodesia but it was also in favour of racial equality for African 
Rhodesians.44 This inevitably meant they were more willing to act as a mediator in 
discussions between Britain and Rhodesia, and Britain and the African members. As well, 
Canada was driven by their desire to keep the Commonwealth as a platform for debate and 
motivated to keep the organisation together.  
 
Watts’ argument is significant for several reasons. Firstly, he explores the underdeveloped 
role of other Commonwealth members during the crisis, steering away from focusing solely 
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on British documents and their actions. In addition, it illuminates the Commonwealth as being 
central to the crisis, and how Canada sought to utilise the organisation to mediate relations as 
well boost its middle power status.45 This is a unique aspect because other authors often deem 
the Commonwealth as meaningless in international affairs, while he claims that it was a 
legitimate institutional actor, alike the UN. In another piece, Watts highlights how “racial 
tension, engendered by the problem of Rhodesian independence, threatened the continued 
existence of the Commonwealth”.46 His analysis does not explore this further; instead he 
focuses predominantly on a narrowly western perspective. Looking only at the relations 
between old Commonwealth members, Watts ultimately fails to understand how the UDI 
affected Africa more generally and how decolonisation played a huge role in the diplomatic 
affairs of the crisis.47 My thesis will avoid a Western centric focus, and offer an analysis to 
correct this one-sided approach.  
 
Murphy contends that the Commonwealth developed “purpose and momentum between the 
1960s and the 1990s” as a result of white-minority rule in Southern Africa.48 Rhodesia made 
the Commonwealth a “concert of inconvenience” in which British decision-making was made 
more challenging because they had to contend with African opinions.49 British members did 
not exclusively guide the Commonwealth to their particular interests, and Murphy highlights 
how the organisation facilitated agency of other actors, who would not necessarily grasp the 
same influencing capabilities in larger, more structured organisations. At the time when 
British public and politicians doubted the purpose and worth of the Commonwealth, African 
independence leaders saw it to “complete the liberation struggle they had begun in their own 
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territories, not just in the political sphere but in the economic one as well”, especially 
Southern Africa.50 Actions on ending racial inequality in Rhodesia was therefore at the 
forefront of those African Commonwealth members, who set out to bring liberation to the 
whole continent. 
 
As former Head of the Commonwealth Institute in London, Murphy offers a valuable 
contribution to its history. While Murphy does highlight the agency of the African 
Commonwealth members in several of his writings, he nonetheless does not develop these 
findings much further than a few sentences. His role and subsequent research has been 
predominantly focused on the relationship between Britain and Commonwealth members, 
which constrains thinking about the organisation beyond the British standpoint. When he 
discusses the most active period of the Commonwealth, he tends to concentrate still on the 
lack of urgency by Britain, especially during the 1960s. It would have been more illuminating 
to look precisely at how other actors acted during the Rhodesian crisis, therefore my thesis 
intends to place the actions taken by African Commonwealth members at the centre of my 
analysis. 
 
Barber explores how the Rhodesian crisis created fractions between those in favour of 
military intervention for racial equality (the “militant idealists”), and those who supported 
Britain, who believed force was not the solution (the “pragmatists”).51 He argues this “created 
the division in the Commonwealth's most vulnerable spot—the issue of race relations”.52 This 
issue proved to make Commonwealth cohesion immensely challenging, and this was largely 
because of the accession of newly independent members. Interestingly Barber points out how 
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Britain attempted to reach consensus on issues, but the Rhodesian crisis meant that 
“consensus politics had been abandoned”.53 Not only due to the increased number of opinions, 
but the fact that discussions were guided by independent African nations on matters of race 
and attempted to move Britain’s opinion towards intervention, in a highly unforgiving and 
uncompromising way. Barber offers a very competent analysis and interesting insight into the 
issue of race during the Rhodesian crisis. However, he does downplay the impact this had on 
the Commonwealth. For instance, Barber states, “Rhodesia had been an important item on the 
agenda, but it had not dominated all else and, while there had been criticism of British policy, 
it was relatively mild”.54 I argue that this criticism was not “relatively mild”, instead the 
denunciation by African members was huge and this led to the complete transformation of the 
Commonwealth. Not only because it pushed race relations to the top of its inter-governmental 
agenda, but it also altered how the organisation positioned itself as a leader on racial equality 
in the wider international system. My thesis will therefore assess the true impact that its 
African members had, leading the Commonwealth into a new era of becoming more active in 
those particular questions.  
 
Contribution to Commonwealth history, politics of race and IR 
 
African independence and their arrival – not only into the Commonwealth but the 
international system – forced the issue of racial inequality onto the global agenda. Racial 
distinction, once deployed as a form of subjugation and “civilisation” over territories, was still 
not considered an important issue in international politics prior to decolonisation.55 Both 
colonial and former dominion actors continued to be indolent about racial discrimination 
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across the early 20th century. Despite the construction of the UN Charter and the affirmation 
of rights to all peoples, racism was not taken seriously until the 1960s. The unprecedented 
wave of decolonisation changed the dynamics between the metropole and colonies, but it also 
meant that newly independent African countries did not idly observe the continuation of racial 
bias in other countries. Connecting their experiences with others from the Global South, 
African members of the Commonwealth created pressure from various angles onto those 
nations that preserved notions of racial superiority. Jensen cites how the UN human rights 
project “was fundamentally reorganised in late 1962 around the issues of race and religion”, 
bringing those topics into the centre of international politics, where previously they had been 
largely negligible.56 When reading through the sources from the National Archives, it 
becomes clear that the gravity and emphasis on racial inequality increases once decolonisation 
was in force. However, little academic literature traces its transformative nature. My 
contribution therefore attempts to show that changes within the Commonwealth were part of 
the wider transformation of the international system and agenda on race, headed for the most 
part by newly independent African nations.  
 
The apartheid regime in South Africa is often discussed in IR, citing how African nations 
internationalised the racial discrimination through the transnational anti-Apartheid movement. 
The case of Southern Rhodesia shows parallels with resistance towards South Africa, however 
it is far less discussed in literature on the Commonwealth and international race relations. 
While the Southern Rhodesian case is given significance in studies about Commonwealth 
relations, the element of race is engaged with far less, in comparison to South African 
apartheid. My thesis will attempt to place this case within the context of the changing 
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international system, where African actors sought to use their new independent status as a 
way of shaping the global agenda. Furthermore, literature on Rhodesia often omits an 
exhaustive account about the role and agency of African Commonwealth members. While it 
highlights the disparities between older and newer members, very little has gone into detail 
about the explicit impact of African actors. My thesis aims to enhance the position of these 
actors, focusing more specifically on their actions rather than the redundancy of British ones, 
and show how those actors not only impacted the Commonwealth, but were an important 
nexus for change in the wider international system.  
 
Analysis 
 
Context of the Rhodesian crisis, 1889-1965 
 
Southern Rhodesia was very unique in comparison to other British colonies. It began as part 
of the wider colonial project carried out by the British South Africa Company during the late 
nineteenth century, to manage and benefit off the expropriation of natural resources in the 
region.57 In 1889, the British South Africa Company received Royal Charter from the Queen, 
enabling them to create treaties, keep a police force, obtain enterprises and develop 
infrastructure.58 Often ignorant and uninterested in local African politics and economics, any 
sign of resistance by native Africans was put down with force. During this period, large 
numbers of white European (mainly British) populations immigrated to the region, creating 
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towns along the way including the future capital, Salisbury. In 1901, the number of white 
settlers were 11,000, increasing to 55,408 by 1936.59 The impact of colonialism was therefore 
magnified by this influx of white settlers, exacerbating levels of violence and the imposition 
of forceful racist practises.60  
 
Southern Rhodesia’s path to independence was made an even greater task, in part because of 
its distinctive status as a British colony, since the British Government never directly governed 
it. In 1922, Britain decided to allow a referendum in Southern Rhodesia, which would 
determine whether to become part of South Africa or create a ‘responsible government’. 
Southern Rhodesia indicated their desire to become a truly self-governing entity, transitioning 
to a “quasi-independent” colony in 1923, and this status ensured its ability to develop 
autonomous powers in defence and to freely determine its own domestic politics and laws of 
enfranchisement.61 From this point onwards, the British Government possessed only 
constitutional responsibility over Southern Rhodesia. They could “negotiate, pressurize, 
persuade, but it could not enforce its will”, thus Britain’s power would be inevitably limited 
during negotiations to prevent Southern Rhodesia’s future UDI. 62 It was hence allowed into 
the Dominions Office along with the older Commonwealth members such as Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia, giving the white minority led government a high level of legitimacy in 
ruling how it desired.63 Different to other British colonies in Africa, Southern Rhodesia had 
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also been allowed to attend Commonwealth meetings, communicate with other members and 
participate as an equal standing dominion since 1932.64  
 
Although the white populations dominated during much of its history, Southern Rhodesian 
Africans did attempt to mobilise and form an all-African alliance during the inter-war period. 
Elites endeavoured to create a union with peasants and workers, as well as connecting with 
Africans in America, France and Britain. However the repressive response by the government 
ensured any alliance was squashed; deporting, imprisoning and killing any person deemed to 
be involved.65 The Second World War, damage to European Empires and the promise of self-
determination expressed in the Atlantic Charter, led to greater empowerment by colonial 
subjects all across the Global South.66 While nationalist movements produced independent 
nations across other parts of Africa, Southern Rhodesia’s independence was further delayed as 
its African elites decided to enter into partnership with the white minority government. 
Eventually, this uneasy alliance was abandoned and in 1957 the African National Congress 
was created. Instead of promoting full enfranchisement as its highest priority, it was expressed 
as an equal demand to, for example, the redistribution of land.67 Only from 1960 would the 
party promote “one man, one vote” as its most vital goal.68 However, African nationalist 
parties within Southern Rhodesia continued to fall short of producing racial equality and 
political suffrage for all, as the government continued to imprison its members and promote 
its own agenda for an independent nation.  
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In 1953 Southern Rhodesia became part of the Central African Federation (CAF), alongside 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, lasting only ten years. From the British perspective, this 
was fabricated in hope of producing less confrontation between the two populations, however 
it was understood by most Africans that it was meant to enhance the power of white settlers. 
The Federation was immensely ostracised by all of its members, especially Southern 
Rhodesia. The then Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead began to pursue full 
sovereignty in 1959, by asking the British Government to reduce their capacity to interfere in 
their affairs.69 The sustained pressure from various colonies including these three caused 
Britain to question the worth of holding onto its empire for much longer, yet it continued to 
reiterate its view that it “would not be abdicating her responsibilities, and would see justice 
done to all races”.70 Also during this time, British Prime Minister Macmillan’s “Winds of 
Change” speech in 1960 seemed to hail a change of direction in Britain’s policy. It not only 
signalled the acceptance that Africans were now ready, or “civilized” enough for majority 
rule, it also cautioned the dangers of apartheid in South Africa and of racial discrimination 
across the continent generally. To the Southern Rhodesia Government and its supporters, this 
was viewed as a rejection by Britain of “dominion ideas of solidarity”, and created deep 
suspicion among those white settlers across the region.71  
 
In 1961, a new Constitution was passed (although the process excluded most Africans from 
voting), which permitted fifteen seats for Africans and stated the promise for eventual, 
political parity for all races.72 This was rejected by the nationalist parties and led to the 
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beginning of violent confrontation with the government.73 In response to the changing 
situation, the Rhodesian Front was created in 1962, enticing other white settlers from 
surrounding areas, forming an “imagined community of English-speaking white people”.74 
Political tug of war between Britain, Southern Rhodesia and the neighbouring colonies 
continued until the break-up of the CAF in 1963, which eventually led to Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, becoming the two independent nations of Zambia and Malawi by 1964. In 
contrast, Britain was unwilling to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia because of the 
failure to commit to the full enfranchisement of all peoples by the government. In addition, 
opposition from Commonwealth members and the UN meant their support of the Rhodesian 
minority government “risked serious damage to Britain’s international reputation”.75 
 
1964 witnessed Ian Smith becoming the leader of the Rhodesian Front, and in 1965 the party 
won every seat that was allocated for white voters. This hailed a turn towards an 
uncompromising Rhodesian Government, headed by a stubborn prime minister. Five 
principles were put forward to enhance Rhodesia’s transition towards majority rule, with very 
few being agreed on.76 Also 1964 saw the Commonwealth meet without Rhodesia, and the 
consensus there was that independence would not be granted without majority rule. After 
recurrent failed negotiations and a deterioration of relations, Prime Minister Smith declared a 
UDI from Britain on the 11th of November 1965. Countering the UDI, the two nationalist 
parties, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union 
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(ZAPU) confirmed their breakaway governments, which led to violence between these two 
and the government armed forces.77 No countries recognised Rhodesia’s independence, with 
Britain claiming it to be illegal against the crown, yet Rhodesian ministers defended their 
stance in protecting the position of white Europeans and remained committed in asserting 
themselves a part of the Commonwealth community. While ideas about racial superiority 
were slowly changing across the Western world, white Rhodesians effectively drew 
sympathies from Britain and previous dominions like Australia and New Zealand, making for 
an even more divisive and lengthy crisis.  
 
Only would Southern Rhodesian become the fully independent and recognised state of 
Zimbabwe in 1980. The impasse of fifteen years not only affected the stability, politics and 
people within its borders, but it also had an enormous effect on the entire international 
community. At different moments in time, various actors came and went – the UN, 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth, Britain and later America – 
attempting to resolve the crisis. It is imperative to note the Cold War dimension of the 
situation. Decolonisation and the Cold War became unequivocally intertwined developments, 
especially on the African continent during this period. Both superpowers were interested in 
harnessing the support of newly independent African nations. Indeed those countries were 
also keen to play the USA and USSR against each other for their own benefit, whether that is 
financially, politically or for security measures, and this was evident in Southern Rhodesia. 
However, my analysis will be primarily concerned with how African Commonwealth 
members promoted the importance of racial equality, rather than the Cold War dimension. 
The Commonwealth was less a site for Cold War politics and more so about issues of race, 
plus as I have discussed in my previous section, little has been discussed to tie both elements 
together.   
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The transforming Commonwealth – a note on South Africa’s membership 
 
Before I examine my case study, I want to illustrate the importance of another moment that I 
believe begins the transition into a new era for Commonwealth relations, and indeed propels 
race onto the forefront of the international agenda. After South Africa had voted to become a 
republic, Britain contacted several heads of state about it remaining a member of the 
Commonwealth. British Prime Minister Wilson was apprehensive to assert his view that this 
was nothing more than a “constitutional technicality”, and tried to devolve it away from South 
Africa’s apartheid policies.78 In a discussion with Nigerian Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa, Wilson argued that India and Pakistan had been allowed to join as republics therefore 
the same should follow for South Africa. While Balewa largely agreed, he emphasised how he 
and other members were displeased by “people who showed no sign of being influenced by 
the other members of the family and who seemed to be opposed to the ideals which the 
Commonwealth stood for”.79 Wilson’s outlook failed to prevail, as South Africa was forced to 
withdraw their membership, and the conference illustrated an enormous conflict of ideas and 
priorities the Commonwealth had once espoused. Despite trying to reach an agreement, 
Wilson was unable to isolate the “technicality” from the issue of race.  
 
The Prime Ministers of South Africa, Dr Verwoerd justified his withdrawal, stating he “could 
not place them [Britain] in the invidious position of having to choose between South Africa 
                                            
78 NAL, PREM 11/3217, Meeting between Wilson and the Tunku, March 6, 1961; NAL, PREM 
11/3217, Wilson and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 6 March, 1961; NAL, PREM 11/3217, Wilson 
and Sir Abubakar Balewa, March 6, 1961; NAL, PREM 11/3217, Wilson and Dr. Verwoerd, March 7, 
1961.  
79 NAL PREM 11/3217, Wilson and Prime Minister Balewa.  
Siobhan Amelia Smith  African actors change the Commonwealth        
31 
 
and a group of Afro-Asian nations”.80 He claims that without his withdrawal, the next step 
would have been expulsion, due to the increasing number and the aggressiveness exhibited by 
those members, where the likes of Ghana, Malaya and Tanganyika were “decidedly and 
actively hostile” on all occasions.81 This illustrates how African and Asian members were 
more than prepared to directly oppose South African’s apartheid regime since it was 
“inconsistent with Commonwealth ideals”.82  
 
This case indicates the turn towards the ‘new’ Commonwealth, where independence of 
African states palpably altered the focus of debates, its cohesion, and to a large extent the very 
meaning of the Commonwealth. Most interestingly, it shows how matters of race and 
ultimately racism were not to be treated with a soft hand, like it had in previous years. African 
members not only used the Commonwealth to facilitate opposition to these policies, but also 
transmitted this onto the wider international agenda. Previous to decolonisation, there was 
very little discussion on race, as it was largely acted upon as a domestic issue. However, given 
the exertion by African actors onto stages like the UN, the international community was 
forced to intervene into states’ matters, if policies were deliberately inhibiting racial equality. 
  
A “Multi-racial” Commonwealth: The July 1964 Conference 
 
The 1964 Commonwealth Conference marks the beginning of the highly contested nature of 
debates about the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Leading up to the meeting in July, there 
were discussions about allowing Rhodesia to join the Conference, and the level of 
contestation and tenacity parallels the rejection of South Africa’s attendance and membership 
of the Commonwealth. Ghanaian President Nkrumah reiterated his stance, as he did 
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previously, that a government who had “been criticised for its racial policies” should not be 
allowed to attend.83 The majority consensus was to prohibit Rhodesia from joining, with much 
of the pressure coming from its ‘coloured’ members. While Southern Rhodesia had been able 
to attend meetings for over thirty years, African members were largely successful in pushing 
it to the fringes of the Commonwealth. Subsequently their pressure facilitated a new criterion 
for membership; the organisation should now seek to reject any member who advocates racial 
prejudice and inequality. This distinction certainly did not exist prior to African 
independence, where it was uncommon for members to individually confront one another. A 
quote by the Canadian Prime Minister epitomizes this: “in the old days, a Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers Conference used to be a pleasant occasion. One met old friends and discussed 
business and whilst the latter discussion might not perhaps be very serious, the ties between 
countries were strengthened by the social contacts”.84 In contrast, meetings were now 
characterised by members openly criticising the domestic policies of others; becoming less 
about mutual bonds to one another and more about promoting Commonwealth principles for 
all its members to share, such as racial equality.  
 
It is interesting to see how the media perceived the changes the Commonwealth was going 
through and an article reported by the Sydney Morning Herald offers this point of view.85 The 
editorial emphasises how the organisation “enters a new phase” and takes on a “new shape”, 
in which London was no longer dominating its meetings.86 It also highlights how the debates 
within meetings were evolving. It reported that African members now prevailed in “speaking 
plainly and bluntly”, forcefully demonstrating their emotion on the Rhodesian issue. 
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Fascinating is the way the author highlights specific characteristics of African leaders such as 
Ghana’s Nkrumah, and their ability to eradicate the customs which existed around the 
meetings, in order to get deep into the debate about Rhodesia. The article claims, “this time it 
was a marathon session with emissaries coming out to cancel Ministers’ dinner 
engagements…frantically trying to get out the final document”. This reveals the huge restraint 
exhibited by the African leaders, altering not only the content of discussions in the 
Conference, but moreover the general atmosphere surrounding it. In addition, this article 
exposes the impression of the Australian media, that the Commonwealth was this new, 
unrecognisable organisation, which was blatantly as a result of the newly independent African 
members.  
 
From the outset, African members were effective in making race relations a central concern 
for the Commonwealth. The final Communiqué of 1964 affirmed that Commonwealth 
Governments should pursue policies that would build a society offering, “equal opportunity 
and non-discrimination for all its people, irrespective of race colour or creed”.87 Promoting 
racial equality was not entirely new to the Commonwealth, evident in Barber’s description of 
how Pakistan criticised South Africa for racial policies that violated the UN Charter in 1954.88 
However its significance was taken much more seriously when the Commonwealth became 
truly “multi-racial” after African independence. Not only due to the fact that the ‘coloured’ 
members now outweighed the ‘non-coloured’ members, but also due to the way that African 
members elevated their pan-African principles. While Tanzania and Ghana had only become 
independent nations a couple of years earlier, Tanzania’s President Nyerere and Ghana’s 
President Nkrumah were hugely concerned with how race continued to manifest in regional 
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and global power relations.89 They had already began attempting to unite African nations 
within the Commonwealth, hence they were all the more willing to create blocs of influence 
in pushing for independence for Southern Rhodesia only when racial distinction within the 
colony was abolished. Guided by these principles, but also the concern that race was still a 
huge detriment to not only Southern Rhodesians but the entire continent, racial issues were to 
be taken much more seriously within the Commonwealth and the wider international system.  
 
The Conference before Rhodesia’s UDI: June 1965 
 
The year 1965 proved an even more difficult one for the British Government, after failing to 
negotiate the terms of independence with Southern Rhodesia’s Prime Minister Ian Smith and 
there were now whispers of a decree of a UDI. In June of 1965, another Commonwealth 
Conference assembled, and there were undoubtedly lengthier and even more disputed 
discussions about the transpiring situation between its members. The British Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State at the Commonwealth Relations Office Saville Garner states, “on the 
whole, Africans are in a chastened mood…and have not been altogether immoderate”.90 His 
personal telegram describes the unsympathetic temperament of the African members towards 
Britain’s position, and it should be noted of the explicit bias of Garner, who faced 
considerable constrains due to the demands made by those actors. Another telegram from a 
day later describes how Ghanaian Nkrumah “led the African attack” against Britain’s 
ineffective efforts in bringing Rhodesia to independence, where he emphasised the desire to 
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end the racialist regime rather than focusing on averting the UDI.91 For Nkrumah, and 
supported by the majority of other African members, bringing discrimination to a halt and 
guaranteeing equality for all races was the most important goal here, rather than conceding 
independence to the racist government. The position on how to achieve this was indifferent to 
the British one, who would have let independence occur in line with the 1961 Constitution, if 
it was not for the pressure exerted onto them.  
 
The substance of the “African attack” demanded for the current constitution to be suspended, 
pushed for a Constitutional Conference, alongside the release of political prisoners in order to 
participate in elections with universal suffrage. The notion of a Constitutional Conference was 
first raised in 1964, yet this time Commonwealth members universally supported it, as a 
means of peaceful transition towards independence. African members were forceful in 
pushing for full, immediate independence whereas the older members were more willing to 
allow for gradual progress. Unified with Nkrumah was Zambia’s president Kaunda, arguing 
that “one man, one vote” should be immediately granted, so that other racialist regimes in the 
region (South Africa and the Portuguese territories) would not “develop into a solid bloc who 
would raise a threat to peace of the whole world”.92 Murrumba – the Kenyan Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – questions why Britain are unwilling to act firmly with this particular colony, 
when they had responded so brutally with the rebellion in Kenya years before; seeming to 
confront its former colony on its own preferential treatment by race.93 While Britain was often 
reluctant to fully concede in its language to the demands made by the African members, the 
Commonwealth conferences ensure they must reckon with this these various voices. The 
language of the Communiqué and the transcripts adjacent to it offers an insight into how the 
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African members tried to translate the gravity of the crisis, constantly pushing for racial 
equality above everything else. In this way, these actors guide the direction of policies to push 
for action now rather than somewhere in the future. They remained a constant force on Britain 
to keep in line with their promise of independence only when everyone in Rhodesia is fully 
represented.   
 
In a letter after the 1965 Conference, Nyerere writes to Prime Minister Wilson reminding him, 
how important this issue is to the “future of Africa and Africa’s relations with Britain”.94 The 
universal (illegal) declaration of independence by Smith in November 1965 meant that 
diplomatic relations between the two countries would indeed contravene by December, after 
the OAU held a Council meeting session in Ethiopia. This meeting released a resolution 
calling on all members to break relations with Britain, if the illegal rebellion led by Smith was 
not crushed. Alongside Tanzania, Ghana was the only other Commonwealth member to 
severe diplomatic relations with Britain, and the reasoning behind these positions was that 
Britain had failed to show an absolute commitment to the full enfranchisement of Africans. It 
was proclaimed that the organisation was “no longer a British Commonwealth” but “a 
Commonwealth of free nations”, revealing that British ascendancy over the association was 
no longer pertinent.95 Arguably taking British power out of the organisation meant that it was 
transformed into a platform in which African Commonwealth members demanded greater 
participation and debate about issues that were not just endorsed by Britain. Unavoidably 
then, the 1960s became a period in which the Commonwealth was dominated by debates 
about racial inequality.   
 
                                            
94 NAL, PREM 13/186, Letter from Nyerere to Prime Minister Wilson, 14 August 1965. 
95 Julius Nyerere quote, found in Arnold Smith, Stiches in Time: The Commonwealth in World Politics 
(Ontario: General Publishing Co. Limited, 1981).  
Siobhan Amelia Smith  African actors change the Commonwealth        
37 
 
The breaking of ties between members and lessening of British authority coincides with the 
expression of condemnation elsewhere. On the 16th of December 1965, as British Prime 
Minister Wilson was addressing the UN General Assembly on the situation in Southern 
Rhodesia, one hundred OAU delegates organised a walk out in protest.96 Internal criticism in 
the Commonwealth was making Britain’s dealings with the crisis a much more arduous task, 
and taking it to the UN created even more international pressure on them. As well as forming 
an “Afro-Asian” bloc in the UN, both parties attempted to facilitate demands that could not be 
ignored, by forming together to call out the continuation of colonial and imperial domination 
by former European powers. African members often attached the Rhodesian issue of 
independence to the wider anti-colonial project. This reveals how African leaders made sure 
their views on continued racial distinction were expressed in a way unavoidable to the British 
Government. The effect of shifting an “internal” matter for the British Government onto the 
broader anti-colonialist movement was the increased involvement by the UN, which would 
help in bringing greater international attention to the crisis.  
 
First testing out their views on Southern Rhodesia at the Commonwealth, African members 
vigorously participated in the UN’s forum, actively pushing for resolutions and injected 
African issues onto the international agenda. In turn, this shaped debates about decolonisation, 
economic progress and the development of equal rights. The 1960s witnessed the overhaul of 
the UN General Assembly, after an overwhelming number of states became independent 
(especially from the African continent). African Commonwealth members endeavoured to 
organise themselves together in their “crusade against white racism”.97 One example of this is 
the 1963 Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, leading to the 
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adoption of the International Convention in 1965. Passing with eighty-nine votes in the 
General Assembly, it affirmed “the necessity of speedily eliminating racial discrimination 
throughout the world, in all its forms and manifestations”.98 For the first time this seriously 
dealt with racial prejudice, and as a result of this pressure, racism was now deemed intolerable 
by international law. It is therefore evident that African members not only impacted the 
debate about racism within Commonwealth, but they were also actively shaping the agenda of 
international relations. They viewed the UN and the Charter as a safeguard for their 
independence and rights, but this had previously been insufficient in preventing such 
prejudice. Thus they enthusiastically used the forum to “participate in world diplomacy”, in 
turn shaping the Commonwealth and transforming the international system.99  
 
From Lagos to London: The January and September 1966 Conferences 
 
The Commonwealth Conference in Lagos, Nigeria in 1966 would be the first one held outside 
of London, and it additionally signified the organisation being taken out of British hands. One 
difference between the Commonwealth and other international organisations was its explicit 
informality. Rules and conventions could quickly and easily change to suit a particular crisis, 
and this was how the Lagos Conference was achieved. At the end of 1965 and Smith’s illegal 
UDI, Nigerian Prime Minister Abubakar put a proposal forward to chair an emergency 
meeting. In various unofficial telegrams and meetings, Abubakar urges for the meeting to 
include a single-issue agenda, so that it could facilitate reasonable and thorough discussions 
about the progress of the Rhodesian situation. Consequently, Wilson was “summoned to 
Africa to answer charges against his handling of an issue on which all black Africans felt 
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incensed”, where he faced pressure and arguments in favour of military engagement from 
those members.100 During this meeting and evident in the Communiqué, African 
Commonwealth members individually criticised Britain’s sluggish engagement in allowing 
the situation to transpire when many Rhodesian Africans were continually discriminated 
against by the white government led by Smith. This Conference was the pinnacle of political 
attacks against Britain; once a ‘British” organisation turned into a platform on which to attack 
its former colonial power. 
 
How to end the rebellion and restore order in Rhodesia was heavily contested, and solving 
this debate was centred around the question on whether to use military force or not. During 
negotiations with Smith and just weeks before the UDI, British Prime Minister Wilson 
publicly announced that Britain would not use force if Rhodesia did intend to declare 
independence.101 Britain continually expressed this outlook, fearing it would lead to full-scale 
war. It was hugely unnerving for Britain to use force against its “kith and kin”, and a 
proportion of the British public as well as the older Commonwealth members generally 
believed this. In addition, the use of force was also considered to be useless if it would force 
Rhodesia into closer relations with other racialist governments in Southern Africa, but also 
from the British point of view, they did not want to hinder their already fragile relations with 
South Africa. Therefore it was largely in favour of continuing the push for economic 
sanctions. The previous November saw the Security Council pass Resolution 217; calling for 
countries to cease economic relations with Rhodesia, and for the most part, many countries 
followed. In addition, Britain proclaimed to have cut 97% of British exports to its former 
colony. During the 1996 Lagos Conference, Wilson stated that he had received expert advice 
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that “the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the 
rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks not months”.102 The emphasis on economic 
sanctions coincides with the unwillingness of Britain and the older members of the 
Commonwealth to the use of force in ending the rebellion.  
 
Although Wilson continually reiterated it was unacceptable to use, the 1966 Communiqué 
managed to state that military force could not be ruled out “if this proved necessary to restore 
law and order”.103 In the meantime there was a Commonwealth Sanctions Committee created 
to ensure that the economic sanctions were being carried out fully and efficiently, as there was 
suspicion that Britain was even bypassing those. Another Security Council resolution (232) 
was passed in 1966, creating a more concrete list of economic sanctions on Rhodesia, 
however this failed to prevent the collapse of the illegal regime. After re-entering into 
negotiations with Smith on board the Tiger at the end of 1966 failed, the African 
Commonwealth members urged Britain to take definitive action to end the white rebellion, 
insisting again on the necessity of military force, since all other peaceful means had been 
explored.  
 
The majority of African members were in favour of using military force. Since Zambia 
bordered Rhodesia and it was economically reliant on it, the government’s actions and 
subsequent handling of the crisis hugely affected Zambia, and thus Prime Minister Kaunda 
was not shy in expressing his disturbance with the developments. He did not attend the 1966 
Conference and used the threat of leaving the Commonwealth to emphasise his frustration 
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with the contradictory and worrisome nature of British policy.104 Straight after the 1966 Lagos 
Conference, the Zambian diplomat Kapwepwe who attended instead of the Prime Minister, 
labelled Wilson a racist hypocrite over the handling of Rhodesia.105 The constant attacks on 
Britain showed the contrasting position that African Commonwealth members exhibited, 
compared to other members. The difference in leadership styles, modes of diplomacy and 
militant backgrounds meant that members belligerently lobbied for all measures to be taken in 
order to end the regime. In comparison to Britain’s focus on avoiding full-scale war, the 
eradication of racial discrimination was their most crucial goal. The impact of this was that it 
created a recognised international demand for the use of force, evident in the Security Council 
resolution 253 in May 1968, calling upon Britain “to take urgently all effective measures to 
bring to an end the rebellion”.106 After two years of political impasse and an increase in 
violence targeted at African Rhodesians, Britain now faced an increased demand from the 
international community to take a serious thought about the use of military force against its 
“own”.  
 
A Matter of Years, Not Weeks: The January 1969 Conference  
 
While discussions about the acceptability of using force were not translated into actual policy, 
African members did succeed in altering the British view about ‘no independence before 
majority rule’ (NIBMR). In late 1966, during a speech in the House of Commons, Wilson 
finally conceded to this view. However, entering into further negotiations with Smith on-
board the Fearless in October 1968, NIMBAR was seen by many Commonwealth members to 
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have been replaced with the acceptance of “unimpeded progress to majority African rule”.107 
This appalled the African Commonwealth members, who saw it as a reverse to NIBMR. In a 
private meeting, President Nyerere candidly suggested to the British Prime Minister that he 
thought the Fearless proposals were a sell-out, and that he could not understand how it could 
be aligned with full democracy.108 Prime Minister Wilson attempts to convince Nyerere to 
accept that Britain has continually stood by NIBMR, however for most of the meeting it is 
clear Nyerere is hugely indifferent to this. President Nyerere takes these views to the 1969 
Conference, and it seems the African caucus successfully encourages most Commonwealth 
members that this position by Britain was unacceptable. The Communiqué stated, “Most 
heads of Government emphasised their view that these proposals were unacceptable as the 
constitution of an independent Rhodesia and should be withdrawn”.109 In this regard, the 
British Government are seen to be at the margins of the collective view and it highlights how 
effective the African members were at ensuring full suffrage and fighting racism remained the 
most important element of the Commonwealth ethos. The 1969 Conference was much less 
forceful than the previous years, however it is clear that African actors continued to guide the 
debate, held the former colonial power to account for their inaction and demanded racial 
equality for Southern Rhodesia and the African continent.  
 
Conclusion 
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By the turn of the 1970s, the struggle for racial equality and full suffrage in Southern 
Rhodesia was far from being complete. The white minority government led by Ian Smith 
would eventually cease to exist by 1980, due to the continued pressure created by economic 
sanctions and the international community. Although this thesis was not concerned with the 
clout of African Commonwealth members in ending the Rhodesian crisis, their involvement 
sheds a light on how they impacted both the Commonwealth and the agenda of international 
relations. It is undeniable that the period of the 1960s witnessed the transformation of the 
Commonwealth of Nations, and that the African members within it had a significant impact 
on this change. Yet academic scholarship on the organisation focuses on the British 
perspective, concentrating on the evolution of British sentient about the Commonwealth, 
Britain’s policies and actions, as well as their declining authority within it. What is evident is 
that this is only one component of an organisation, and while at one point it dominated the 
organisation, after African independence this significantly changed.  
 
There are few academics that write about the Commonwealth from an alternative vantage 
point. This includes Carl Watts’ assessments of the “old” Commonwealth members and their 
relevance during the Rhodesian crisis, however his focus creates a western dominated 
perspective.110 As well, there have been some notable exceptions on the organisation’s history. 
This includes Sue Onslow’s analysis of the role it played during the Cold War era, where she 
argues it took the lead in issues outside of the bipolar power politics, such as racial justice.111 
Furthermore, JBD Miller offers a comprehensive and extensive study of the Commonwealth, 
in which one chapter highlights the ‘African dimension’.112 Nonetheless, it remains that there 
is no comprehensive study on the impact that African members had on the Commonwealth, 
hence my thesis endeavoured to focus this aspect. Tracing the agency of those members 
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during the Rhodesian crisis enables an assessment of the Commonwealth from a different 
perspective, and begins to engage with its unquestionably global history.  
 
The 1960s saw the reinvigoration of the Commonwealth in several ways. Firstly, it transpired 
as a platform in which its members could openly and willingly critique each other. By the end 
of the 1960s, the “old” Commonwealth members seemed more willing to critique Britain’s 
position on the handling of Rhodesian and NIBMR, whereas it was often unwilling to 
previously. However this level of criticism was very different to the way that its African 
members impacted the meetings. What was clear then was that the Commonwealth moved 
from a largely homogenous, cohesive organisation with very little restraint to a global multi-
racial one. While at times it was hugely fragmented and compromise proved difficult, it 
facilitated much more ardent and meaningful considerations. During Commonwealth 
meetings, cooperation on the Rhodesian situation was hugely problematic, and this in itself 
could be seen as a detrimental impact caused by the admission of newly independent African 
members. Nonetheless this African dimension injected new issues and questions into the 
Commonwealth; once indifferent to racism, the agenda and its ethos now promoted racial 
egalitarianism. Guided by a strong sense of pan-Africanism, African Commonwealth 
members revealed their commitment in the “fight against the colonial and imperial forces”.113  
 
Secondly, it became clear that the Commonwealth after African independence would indeed 
play an increased part in the international system. The 1964 Communiqué stated, “The 
Commonwealth has a particular role to play in the search for solutions to the inter-racial 
problems which are threatening the orderly development of mankind in general.”114 The 
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demands and pressure exerted from within the organisation by its African members 
empowered it to perform a bigger international role on racial equality. Not only regarding the 
situation in Rhodesia, but across Southern Africa and Africa generally, the Commonwealth 
increased their involvement in international concerns on race relations, a role that is unlikely 
to have become so prominent without the actions of its African members.   
 
Additionally, African members seemed to have an effect beyond the realm of the 
Commonwealth. At the beginning of the crisis, the use of force was completely ruled out by 
most countries (not including African ones), however by the end of the 1960s, the UN had 
argued for all possible means to be used to bring an end to the illegal regime. Furthermore, 
African Commonwealth members often moved in between the two forums, pushing for the 
debate to remain focused on the global equality for all races and took part in resolutions to 
make sure international law was also in line with removing the viability of racial 
discrimination. In this way, they were not only shaping the agenda of the Commonwealth, but 
they also made changes to the international agenda.  
 
Looking beyond this thesis, future research on the Commonwealth bares a fascinating task, 
since there is a considerable amount of room to uncover different perspectives. One 
interesting element that arose was the political unity, dialogue and difficulties between the 
African and Asian members of the Commonwealth. The prominence of the Afro-Asian 
movement coincides with this period, and while the likes of David Kimche and Vijay Prishad 
detail its understudied impact; they do not consider how this was further facilitated within the 
forum of the Commonwealth.115 Additionally, it would be interesting to assess how African 
resistance against southern Rhodesia fit within the broader liberation of the region of Southern 
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African during this period. Nonetheless, this thesis endeavored to trace the agency of the 
African members within the Commonwealth, exposing the explicit impact they had on the 
Commonwealth after their independence. Looking back to the 1960s now reveals how the 
Commonwealth transformed into an organisation unimaginable from its inception, yet it 
proved to be a much more prominent forum and actor in the history of decolonisation and the 
struggle for racial equality.   
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